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ABSTRACT: This paper analyzes a corpus of political rhetoric to identify the rationale for Ontario’s 
financial literacy education (FLE) policy decisions that came about in the wake of the 2008 global 
financial crisis. The complex politics of FLE were shaped and legitimized by special-interest 
coalitions’ mobilization of power, characterized by unsubstantiated claims about its efficacy. The 
rhetoric amounted to ‘truthiness’ over argumentation through the neglect of empirical evidence. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Politics play a crucial role in educational policy.  Education is always “subject to the 
vicissitudes of the political process” (Levin, 2009, p. 69) in which the definitions of 
policy problems and their solutions are “necessarily ambiguous” (Bridgman & 
Barry, 2002, p. 159). To arrive at better education policy, researchers and policy 
analysts must explore the arguments underlying public policy, and to uncover how 
their assumptions function within political rhetoric – that is, within the corpus of 
speeches, proclamations and policy statements in which such arguments are 
presented. The recent debate about financial literacy in education policy provides an 
example where many of the assumptions on which the political rhetoric rests are 
subject to serious, and perhaps typical, shortcomings. 
 While a “faint cry” for financial literacy education “had been audible for 
decades” (Willis, 2008a, p. 2), its volume was amplified in the wake of the 2008 
global financial crisis, resulting in swift government action to mandate K-12 
financial literacy policy. In the wake of the 2008 global financial crisis, financial 
literacy education received increased political attention worldwide as an important 
policy solution to achieve a variety of ends. The OECD stated, 
 
In the aftermath of the global financial crisis, financial education issues have 
reached a momentum and financial literacy has gained international recognition as 
a critical life skill for individuals. In this respect, more and more countries are 
developing tailored financial education strategies and programmes, are introducing 
financial education into the school curriculum and designing dedicated learning 
frameworks (OECD, 2011, p. 2). 
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This paper examines how key arguments advocating financial literacy education 
policy were shaped and legitimized more by the values of special-interest coalitions’ 
and the mobilization of their power - in particular arguments resting on claims 
about the ability of financial literacy education to solve national and regional 
economic problems and inferences about its efficacy. These arguments rested on 
little more than ‘truthiness’ (that is, claims of knowing something intuitively without 
regard for evidence, logic, or facts), rather than on the application of serious 
reasoning and the consideration empirical evidence. By analyzing such a corpus of 
political rhetoric, this paper attempts to identify the rationale offered for financial 
literacy policy decisions, and seeks to highlight serious shortcomings in the 
argumentation found there. The data I will analyse will confirm former Deputy 
Minister Benjamin Levin’s observation that “for politicians, what people believe to 
be true is much more important than what may be true in fact” (2005, p. 19). Finally, 
the paper explores strategies to counter ‘truthiness’ in the debate about education 
policy issues by offering instead approaches to argumentation that might have a 
healthy impact on policy production. 
 
2. CONTEXT AND BACKGROUND 
 
The OECD has been a major force in advocating financial literacy education 
worldwide since it launched its Financial Education Project in 2003 (Smith, 2005). 
The 2008 global financial crisis created a sense of political urgency about financial 
literacy education policy (OECD, 2011), even though prior attention had already 
focused on the development of such curricula by a number of G20 nations. In some 
cases, financial literacy education was overtly tied to larger economic problems. For 
example, in the US, “Some of the country's economic woes might have been 
prevented if students were taught financial literacy” (Koranda, 2009). United States 
Representative Gene Whisnant stated, “You don't have to look very far for relevancy 
to see the bad decisions consumers made with these subprime loans. Financial 
literacy is very important in our society. The education system needs to find some 
way to provide that” (Loew, 2009).  
 As global political attention to financial literacy increased, so did the push for 
its measurement and quantification. The OECD announced that the first large-scale 
international study to assess financial literacy among 15-year-olds would 
commence in 2012 and be included within the Programme for International 
Students Assessment (PISA). This action might result in further political attention to 
the issue once international scores begin to be released, as had occurred with other 
long-standing components of PISA (e.g., literacy, science and mathematics rankings). 
 This paper is concerned specifically with financial literacy education in 
Canada and Ontario, where the call for it was politically prominent. While Canada 
was affected by the 2008 global financial crisis through slower economic growth, 
tightened credit policy and losses in the S&P/TSX, the negative effects were far less 
pronounced than in other OECD countries (Durocher, 2008; Porter, 2010), even 
though personal bankruptcies had increased by approximately 4% in 2008 over the 
previous year (HRSDC, 2011). Notably, Canada was the only G7 country that avoided 
a government bank bailout, and it was ranked first of 134 countries on the 
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soundness of its banks (Porter, 2010). Canada’s ability to weather the 2008 crisis 
with less impact than other developed countries was, in part, due to its more 
stringent regulation of the financial sector (Durocher, 2008).   
 Despite Canada’s relative economic success in 2008, overt connections 
between financial literacy and the economy were made. For example, one media 
report proclaimed that “after the 2008 market crash, the federal government 
realized people needed help with spending, saving, investing and borrowing. The 
federal government apparently had concerns about Canadians “taking on more debt 
during the recession and suffering when low interest rates started climbing again’” 
(Roseman, 2010, p. 2). Roseman (2010) reported that this concern led to the 
development of financial literacy education policies. In Ontario, the Minister of 
Education indicated in an interview that growing debt and “reckless personal 
spending” prompted the province to pursue financial literacy education policy 
(Brown, 2009).  
 The perceived political importance of financial literacy education as a 
solution to issues of economic prosperity led to action on the part of the Canadian 
federal government, through Minister of Finance Jim Flaherty, to establish a Task 
Force on Financial Literacy in 2009. Because the federal government does not have 
jurisdiction over education policy, it rarely undertakes initiatives related to 
education. Financial literacy education was one of the few exceptions in the past 
decade. Members were appointed to the Task Force on Financial Literacy, though 
the composition the Task Force was criticized. The chair of the task force was the 
chief executive officer of Sun Life Financial, a private-sector organization. Its vice-
chair was the chairman of a major bank. The other eleven members included 
educators, consultants, financial advisers and journalists. Only one member of the 
group, an executive director of a nonprofit credit counselling service, had direct 
experience working with people who live in poverty and/or struggle financially. The 
Task Force, criticized for poorly-publicized public “consultations”, was described as 
operating “under cover” and purposely keeping a low profile (Kirby, 2010). At the 
same time, the Task Force created an official space for discussion about financial 
literacy, paving the way for “forum politics” (Radaelli, 1999, p. 679) that allowed a 
powerful group to initiate and gate-keep discussion. Similarly, Ontario initiated 
provincial task force consultations that took place quietly and with little publicity 
until after the release of its report, although it also offered a localized place for 
forum politics to occur. 
 The national Task Force released a report in 2010, entitled Report of 
recommendations on financial literacy: Canadians and their money: Building a 
brighter financial future. The report defined financial literacy as: “having the 
knowledge, skills and confidence to make responsible financial decisions” (2010, p. 
10). Two of the national Task Force’s thirty recommendations for a national strategy 
addressed to the work of provincial Ministries of Education.  
 The Ontario Ministry of Education began working towards such a curriculum 
prior to the completion of the national Task Force report, first with a release of a 
provincial Report of the Working Group on Financial Literacy titled A Sound 
Investment, Financial Literacy Education in Ontario Schools (2010) – a document that 
supported the Federal Task Force’s recommendations for compulsory financial 
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literacy education in the K-12 school system. In July 2011, The Ontario Ministry of 
Education released two policy documents in response to the Report of the Working 
Group on Financial Literacy: Financial Literacy, Grades 4-8: Scope and Sequence of 
Expectations and Financial Literacy, Grades 9–12: Scope and Sequence of 
Expectations. These two documents were an aggregation of any existing learning 
outcomes from the “official” curriculum that had a direct or indirect connection to 
financial literacy and represented a first phase of policy action, with the rest to be 
completed in 2012. In total, the Ministry committed $1.9 million to the development 
of subsequent K-12 financial literacy resources and professional learning 
opportunities for teachers in support of the implementation of the first two Scope 
and Sequence documents. 
 
3. METHODS 
 
As the context just described suggests, the politics surrounding financial literacy are 
extensive, but also complex. I collected documentary evidence of the financial 
literacy education debate in the form of newspaper articles, speech transcripts, 
transcripts of debates in the Ontario Legislative Assembly, and official reports. Sixty-
eight newspaper articles were analyzed, obtained by a search for the keyword 
“financial literacy” in the Proquest Canadian Newsstand database, and narrowed to 
include all of those that addressed financial literacy education between January 
2008 (the start of the period of global financial crisis) and August 2011. I also 
included two government reports pertaining to financial literacy: the federal Task 
Force on Financial Literacy’s (Report of recommendations on financial literacy: 
Canadians and their money: Building a brighter financial future (2010),  and 
Ontario’s Report of the Working Group on Financial Literacy entitled A Sound 
Investment, Financial Literacy Education in Ontario Schools (also 2010). I reviewed 
transcripts from the Legislative Assembly of Ontario for the time period studied, and 
identified discussions at the provincial level that had to do with financial literacy 
education. Finally, I included three speeches given by Canadian Minister of Finance 
Jim Flaherty during the timeframe studied, each of which addressed the issue of 
financial literacy education. By drawing on these varied data sources, I was able to 
triangulate arguments in the political rhetoric.  
 
Source Number of items reviewed 
Toronto Star 17 
Globe & Mail 13 
National Post 13 
Windsor Star 5 
Edmonton Journal 4 
Montreal Gazette 4 
Vancouver Sun 4 
Ottawa Citizen 3 
The Province 2 
Calgary Herald 2 
Winnipeg Free Press 1 
Total (newspapers) 68 
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Source Number of items reviewed 
Speeches 3 
Reports 2 
Legislative Hansard 2 
Table 1: Summary of the Corpus of Texts 
 
 For the purpose of interpretive analysis, I treated the corpus of texts 
holistically, since deconstructing data into discrete pieces or using quantitative 
coding methods can lead to misinterpretation (Mello, 2002). Rather, I employed 
Mello’s (2002) cognitive perception approach, applying collocation to multiple 
sources of data within the broader political environment and simultaneously 
identifying textual, transactual, and socio-cultural operations (Mello, 2002). In doing 
so, I applied a grounded theory approach (Morrell, 2006), consistent with Fischer’s 
(2003) methodological suggestions for interpretative analysis. I began by reviewing 
the texts collected as a whole, reading and re-reading in order to identify arguments 
in an inductive and interpretive fashion.  
 I also used collocation analysis to identify unique, recurrent semantic devices 
(Mello, 2002). I did this in two ways. First, I applied qualitative interpretation by 
reading and highlighting documents. I further ran all text files through a corpus 
linguistics research software tool AntConc 3.2.4 to verify my interpretation, since 
the software would identify collocations that I may have missed. I also searched for 
schemes and tropes operating within the data sources, with particular attention to 
the trope of metaphor as a rhetorical device shaping arguments (Morrell, 2006). 
 
4. FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION 
 
The first instance of a statement about financial literacy education in the timeframe 
studied occurred on May 8, 2008, within a speech by Minister of Finance Jim 
Flaherty (Flaherty, 2008). Prior to reports of that speech, there had been no press 
reports in 2008 concerning financial literacy. Some media outlets picked up on the 
Minister’s statement, and by May 12, 2008, financial literacy education began to 
make its way into print news media. By 2010, the Ontario Ministry of Education 
established its Working Group on Financial Literacy to clarify the meaning of 
financial literacy and make recommendations for provincial curriculum policy. As 
the reports of the federal Task Force and Ontario’s provincial Working Group were 
released, the frequency of news stories concerning financial literacy education 
increased, many of which were in response to Task Force and Working Group 
recommendations. In Ontario’s provincial legislature, the creation of financial 
literacy policy received some attention in debates among Members of Provincial 
Parliament (MPPs). Given that many of the news stories, and much of the public 
debate, were based on government proclamations, it appears public discourse was 
initiated by the federal government, and was subsequently picked up by media 
outlets. This is consistent with prior research that points to the media’s role as a 
political conduit (Shanahan, McBeth, Hathaway, & Arnell, 2008). 
 All documents in the corpus ultimately share an important point of 
commonality: they position financial literacy education as an important and 
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legitimate policy solution to the problem of economic instability. As one journalist 
pointed out, “The noble goal of boosting financial literacy is like motherhood or 
apple pie: You won't find many bad-mouthing it” (Chevreau, 2011, p. FP10). This 
strong statement is an example of the extent to which political rhetoric elevated 
financial literacy education to “sacred cow” status, since all texts in the corpus 
advocated some form of financial literacy education.  
 Despite financial literacy education’s apparent and pervasive sacred cow 
status, two different (but related) arguments emerged about its goal, about what 
and whose perspectives ought to set that goal, and about what sorts of policy 
solutions might achieve it. The data analysis revealed two different groups who 
were putting forth a total of four arguments in various public discourses.  
 The first group, which was made up of financial industry representatives and 
politicians at the federal and provincial levels, argued that financial literacy 
education policy was urgently needed. This first conclusion (I will call it 1a) was 
based on three premises. 
 First, that Canada was experiencing a “crisis” of “risks to financial well-being 
posed by financial illiteracy” (Task Force, 2010), leaving not only individuals but the 
entire economy in peril. : “Recent economic events have brought into relief the 
serious risks to financial well-being posed by financial illiteracy,” the federal Task 
Force (2010, p. 13) stated. The word “crisis” appeared a total of thirteen times in the 
corpus of newspaper articles. The crisis premiss was based on three pieces of data: 
(1) Canadians had taken on too much debt; (2) Canadians had not saved enough as a 
group; and (3) Bankruptcies increased by 22% over the previous year.  
 Second that poverty can be attributed to financial illiteracy. Canadians, 
according to this premiss, simply lacked the skills, knowledge and behaviours to 
participate effectively in the economy. Canadian Finance Minister Jim Flaherty (who 
established the federal Task Force) pronounced in a speech at the Conference on 
Financial Education in Washington, DC: “We are graduating people who can design 
and build complex buildings and bridges, but cannot effectively manage their 
personal finances” (Flaherty, 2008). This statement used synecdoche to support the 
argument by concretizing the problem, and, as Stone (2002) has argued, to suspend 
critical thinking. The image of the engineer who cannot manage her own money is a 
powerful synecdoche, and one that garners the attention of the listener through 
pointing out a flaw in the education system. The engineer example also underscores 
the ideal of individual action – a theme that appears in other texts. For example, 
journalist Andrew Allentuck uses rhetorical questioning as a device to individualize 
the problem: 
 
You find yourself deep in debt and you can't get out. Who is responsible? Is it the 
financial institution who handed you the rope you used to hang yourself? Or should 
you be looking in the mirror?  
 
In this quote, the “blame” was clearly shifted away from the financial institutions, 
and placed squarely on the person in the mirror. This part of the political argument 
tied individual financial literacy to national economic strength as a reason for its 
importance:  “improving the financial decisions made by Canadians will make our 
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economy stronger” (Task Force, 2010) since, as federal Minister of Finance Jim 
Flaherty pointed out, “our economy is built on millions of everyday financial 
decisions by Canadians” (Stewart & Menard, 2011, p. B13). This part of the 
argument fell into the trap of the fallacy of composition in that it ignores the crucial 
role of financial systems in producing economic outcomes, instead erroneously 
overlooking “the structuring influences on individual action which are inherent to 
capitalism” (Arthur, 2011, p. 194).  
 A third and final premiss of the argument for 1a then attempted to tie 
increased financial literacy to individual prosperity for all Canadians and Ontarians. 
Ontario Member of Provincial Parliament (MPP) Charles Sousa, in the Legislative 
Assembly, stated, “I believe financial literacy plays a role in reducing poverty in 
Ontario. We want consumers and those most vulnerable to have better choices so 
that there will be fewer people in financial difficulty” (House Hansard, 2009).  
 Defenders of this premiss also asserted that Canadians and Ontarians had 
taken on too much debt and failed to sufficiently save money because of their lack of 
knowledge, leaving them in peril. This part of the argument relied on the repetition 
of several studies as a means of persuasion, which were mentioned in speeches and 
in the media. First, the media reported several times that the 2009 Statistics Canada 
Canadian Financial Capability Survey showed that Canadians were not performing 
well with respect to personal finances: for every $100 of income, Canadians owed 
$150 in debt. The report was quoted as saying that bankruptcies increased by 22% 
over the previous year. These data were used within newspaper articles, sometimes 
to offer added support when reporting Ministerial and Task Force statements.  
 In addition, newspapers often cited a Harris/Decima poll – conducted on 
behalf of the Canadian Institute of Charted Accountants (CICA) – which found that 
85% of Canadians believed financial literacy education in schools could help youth 
be more prepared to manage their money upon entering the workforce. This was 
part of an attempt to appeal to “objective” facts as a reason to address financial 
literacy – the data describe the perception that individuals continue to make poor 
choices, and that Canadians can overcome these poor choices via education. The 
framing of the statistics was such that citizens were presented as “victims” of a lack 
of knowledge that was not (but should be) addressed in schools. Fischer (2003) and 
Stone (2002) have argued that the use of statistics in this way is “numbers as 
metaphors” (Fischer, 2003, p. 170).  
 In short, the argument for 1a implied that by providing financial literacy 
education to Canadians, the federal and provincial governments could save the day 
by empowering citizens in peril to make their way out of a bad situation. As the 
president of the Canadian Banker Association states in a February 16, 2010 National 
Post piece 
 
Those working for banks across the country are experts in financial matters and are 
eager to work with governments and other stakeholders to help improve the 
financial literacy of all Canadians, empowering people to make informed decisions 
and take control of their financial future. 
 
Similarly, Minister of Finance Flaherty was quoted as emphasizing the need for 
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“collaboration with other levels of government and the private sector” (Roseman, 
2011, p. B4). These quotations placed an emphasis on “partnership” between 
government, the financial services industry and the education sector (Task Force, 
2010). By positioning the industry as able to “fix” individual problems, that industry 
was absolved of any responsibility for economic problems to which it may have 
contributed. 
 A second argument put forth by financial industry representatives and 
politicians concluded that (1b) literacy education policy should be developed and 
enacted through a financial industry and government partnership. It based this 
conclusion on the premiss that industry held the expert knowledge required to 
create such a curriculum. 
 In addition to these arguments put forth by financial industry 
representatives and politicians, two additional arguments appeared in data. These 
last two arguments were put forth by several prominent journalists (Ellen Roseman, 
James Daw, Jonathan Chevreau), the non-profit Investor Education Fund (IEF), and 
the Canadian Community Reinvestment Coalition, an Ottawa-based bank watchdog 
group.  
 The first of this second group of arguments concluded (2a) that, while 
financial literacy education might be valuable, it ought to be developed without 
industry involvement.  
 This argument rested principally on the premise that the financial sector and 
government representatives at the helm of policy and curriculum production were 
elites who “played a role in the losses Canadians suffered in the recession” – in other 
words, these “foxes in the chicken coop” were liable to misinform Canadians. 
Presentations of the argument for 2b usually began with a proclamation of support 
for financial literacy, immediately followed by criticism of the special interests 
responsible for the dominant narrative, calling for “populist leadership” (Roseman, 
2010, p. 2) in lieu of industry insiders. For example,  
 
Now I am as much in favour of financial literacy as the next guy. I could use more. 
But I thought it was pretty clear that the financial sector's opportunistic lending 
practices and complicated, morally bankrupt investment products ruined 
everything. If so, then what possible benefit from literacy enhancement can we 
expect from a task force sponsored by government and headed by two top financial 
executives? (Daw, 2009, p. B2) 
 
Proponents of this argument accused members of the Task Force and Working 
Group as being elites who were out of touch with Canadians “from all walks of life 
and socio-economic levels” (Goar, 2010, p. A19). This contradicted the first 
argument’s characterization of the “crusaders” who would solve economic 
problems. Proponents of the argument for 2b repeatedly pointed out that members 
of the Task Force were industry insiders who “played a role in the losses Canadians 
suffered in the recession” (Goar, 2010, p. A19), and were simply opportunistic 
entrepreneurs who profit from financial illiteracy as “Canadians are chiselled and 
misled by giant financial institutions whose ability to dream up sneaky fees and 
hidden expenses are enough to defeat even a PhD in financial literacy” (Bryan, 2010, 
p. E2).  
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 Further, those arguing for 2a went to say, “financial industry profits are made 
on the backs of illiterates” (Chevreau, 2010, p. FP10), thus calling into question the 
motivation of the elites to eliminate financial illiteracy. The vilification of industry 
members was overtly described in colourful and metaphorical terms in one news 
item, comparing the Task Force report to: 
 
the soothing words of the foxes, spoken upon taking command of the chicken 
coop…The big financial service providers profit from financial illiteracy, whether in 
the form of bank fees and service charges or in the form of 'advice' disguised as sales 
pitches for their own products (Chevreau, 2010, p. FP10). 
 
This particular article concluded with an especially powerful metaphor in direct 
response to the Task Force report’s content: “the foxes must be licking their lips” 
(Chevreau, 2010, p. FP10). While this metaphor appeared in the one article, it is 
universally applicable as an organizing descriptor for the argument as a whole.   
 Presentations of the argument for 2a often used emotional appeals; 
conveying injustice in the selection of Task Force members, and the fact that their 
privileged and industry-insider status was reflected in the national report. The 
argument was presented through colourful linguistic tropes constructed using 
words such as: outrage, suspicion, sneaky, opportunistic, frustrating, and fleeced. To 
further this point, advocates of the argument offered examples and stories to 
underscore the idea that no amount of financial literacy could address industry or 
systemic issues beyond consumers’ control. For instance, one suggested, “remind 
the government that appointed you how little point there is in being financially 
literate if you wind up at age 60 or 65 discovering that much of your company 
pension has just evaporated in a bankruptcy proceeding” (Bryan, 2010, p. E2). 
 Another premiss in the argument for 2a called the effectiveness of financial 
literacy education into question, quoting researcher Lauren Willis, and moving to a 
partial attack on the evidence behind the policy solution proposed by the first group 
- a solution which presupposed the efficacy of financial literacy education in schools. 
Economic woes aside, proponents of this argument presented quotes from “experts” 
who argued that financial literacy programs were ineffective and amount to “little 
more than a political guise designed to quell calls for more government regulation of 
the financial sector” (Trichur, 2009, p. B1), thus debunking the Task Force’s policy 
solution.  
 Like the first group of arguments (for 1a and 1b), this argument for 2a also 
relied on selected statistical data, affirming the use of numbers as metaphors 
(consistent with Fischer, 2003; Stone, 2002). One article (Daw, 2009, p. B2), for 
instance, quoted American researcher Lauren Willis who claims that no evidence 
exists to support financial literacy education’s efficacy, and that such educational 
effort “dupes consumers into thinking they can master the financial services market, 
while placing blame upon them for their failure to do so, deflecting political 
pressure for change.” Yet another media source quoted Willis: “When consumers 
find themselves in dire financial straits, the regulation through education model 
blames them for their plight, shaming them and deflecting calls for effective market 
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regulation. Requiring consumers to act as their own financial experts is socially 
inefficient” (Trichur, 2009, p. B1). 
 The final argument put forth by this second group concluded that (2b) 
stricter industry regulation – not financial literacy education – was a better policy 
solution for the “economic crisis.” This conclusion was based on the premiss that 
macro and individual economic problems (poverty, debt, inadequate savings) are 
equally or more a consequence of reckless industry action that would be better 
addressed through regulation.  
 Thos arguing for 2b typically expressed the hope that policy-makers would 
shift their focus to better regulation in an environment stacked against the interests 
of individuals. Journalist Rob Carrick pointed out potential problems of having 
industry involved in financial literacy education: 
…if we're going to have a financially literate society, we need to understand that making 
people smarter means they're going to ask more questions. When they do, they'll be up 
against a financial industry that is as much a part of the financial literacy problem in 
Canada as the solution (Carrick, 2011, p. B13).  
While this second group of arguments served as a cautionary tale for Canadians to 
be wary of financial literacy education as a guise for something else, it failed to offer 
a concrete and a coherent alternate policy solution in place of the Task Force’s 
curriculum. 
  
4.1 The problem of truthiness: over-simplification instead of evidence-based policy 
 
Despite calls for evidence-based policy (see, for example, Boswell, Geddes & 
Scholten, 2011; Cooper, Levin & Campbell, 2009; Slavin, 2008), reliance on popular 
pressure, common-sense wisdom, and values has been well-documented as a 
feature of politics and policy-making (Boswell, Geddes & Scholten, 2011; Stone, 
2002). The arguments just described rely on “truthiness” (a term coined by Stephen 
Colbert, referring the “attachment to one’s opinions because they ‘feel right’ 
potentially leading to harmful action or inaction,” Narvaez, 2010, p. 163) over 
evidence to justify policy solutions. The “common sense” reasoning, especially 
evident in the argument made for 1a, suggests a clear, linear and over-simplified 
political response to the threat of financial instability. In particular, that argument 
offered a few (unjustified) causal links: first, that economic problems are a result of 
individual financial “misbehaviour” (e.g., too much debt, not enough savings); 
second, that the “misbehaviour” is a direct result of lack of knowledge; and third, 
that education would increase knowledge which in turn would decrease 
“misbehaviour.”  
  In this “truthy” over-simplification, a certain part of the story never gets told 
by the popular political rhetoric. If such arguments had taken a rational approach to 
their construction, they might have attempted to accurately convey the causes of 
national and global instability as the core of the problem, and to offer policy 
solutions that address those causes.  
 First, the “common sense” social implications of financial literacy are 
portrayed as levelling the playing field for individual wealth accumulation through 
education alone (Burk, 2009; Van Wageningen, 2011). This over-simplification is 
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one of many examples of symbolic condensation. Contrary to “truthy” claims made 
in the arguments described, a successful social policy of financial literacy education 
would need to be far more complex.  In a very general sense, literacy is a socially 
constructed activity that both contributes to creating the reality in which it operates 
and is simultaneously influenced by that reality; “each has a part in the construction 
of the other” (Gee, 1990, p. 5). Thus, an examination of any form of literacy – 
including financial literacy – requires consideration of how it operates within social 
contexts, and how the social contexts influence (and are influenced by) individuals’ 
understandings. Without attention to such issues, financial literacy education is at 
risk of replicating inequities, and contributing to the continued marginalization of 
already vulnerable populations - just the opposite of the outcomes endorsed in the 
political rhetoric (Arthur, 2011). This speaks to the role that researchers can and 
should continue to play through continued inquiry about the nature of financial 
literacy education programmes and resources, as well as their outcomes.  
 Second, turning to the nature and findings of the available research might 
have led to significantly different policy solutions, especially on the part of the 
Ontario Ministry of Education. The OECD itself attributed the financial crisis to 
global macro policies affecting liquidity (low interest rates, fixed exchange rates, 
and liquidity reservoirs) and to a “very poor regulatory framework” especially in the 
area of mortgages and off-balance-sheet activity (Blundell-Wignall, Atkinson & Lee, 
2008, p. 2), not to lack of individual knowledge as stated in the argument for 1a 
described earlier. Together, such policies together with inadequate regulation 
caused macroeconomic weakness, economic imbalance, over-leverage and credit 
risks that ultimately resulted in the global crisis. Plainly put, lenders became greedy, 
and nothing was in place to stop them from aggressively selling credit to individuals 
and corporations who were credit risks. While one might argue that individual 
decisions to take on risky debt might have contributed to the problems, this is more 
a consequence of the underlying causes outlined by the OECD, and is not necessarily 
a primary cause. Interestingly, this type of evidence could have been used to the 
benefit of the argument for 2a, but that would have required revising the conception 
of financial literacy, thus jeopardizing its sacred cow status. As well, 
acknowledgement of evidence-based factors would have necessitated an 
exploration of different policy solutions. That is to say, if the cause of instability is 
poor regulation, then the solution would involve regulatory reform, not education 
policy.  
 The selected statistics about Canadians used to define the problem (high 
levels of consumer debt, low levels of financial knowledge) avoided data about 
financial literacy education itself. “Success” in financial literacy is, of course, 
dependent upon what criteria are used to measure it and the form that the 
educational intervention takes. Evidence about the efficacy of financial literacy 
education in K-12 education with respect to retention and application of curriculum 
content remains contested. Whereas the body of research published to date tips in 
support of Willis’ (2008a, 2008b) position that it is ineffective with respect to 
adolescent students’ immediate comprehension (see, for example, Mandell & 
Hanson, 2009; Peng, Bartholomae, Fox, & Cravener, 2007) and on subsequent adult 
behaviour (see, for example, Cole & Shastry, 2009; Mandell & Hanson, 2009; 
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McCormick 2009;), a few small-scale studies have reported success in immediate 
learning (see, for example, Pang, 2010; Sherraden, Johnson, Guo & Elliott, 2011). 
Others reported mixed results depending on specific contextual factors with respect 
to adolescents’ comprehension and immediate use (Danes & Haberman, 2007; 
Walstad, Rebeck & MacDonald, 2010). 
 Despite the many and strong criticisms calling attention to the inefficacy of 
financial literacy education among adolescents – especially in the many quotes 
attributed to Lauren Willis (2008a, 2008b) in the corpus – not one text in the corpus 
supporting the arguments for 2a and 2b suggested that it should be flatly eliminated 
or even its sacred cow status be called into question. Thus, reasoning in those 
arguments as well was weak and contradictory: it supported a policy solution that it 
disproved of, without making any attempt to resolve this apparent contradiction.   
 All four arguments considered above failed to use evidence effectively and 
accurately. For example, the political rhetoric in the argument for 1a failed to 
venture beyond selected, perfunctory bits of empirical evidence, ignoring data on 
Canada’s economic standing and individual financial outcomes in comparison to 
other OECD and G7 countries; and failed to acknowledge other, serious and 
empirically sound data on the factors contributing to the 2008 financial crisis (e.g., 
the OECD rationale just stated, and Canada’s relative economic strength described 
earlier in this paper).  
 Finally, the nuances and complexities of global, national, and provincial 
economic problems and systemic factors were lost in the truthiness of the symbolic 
condensation (see, for example, Arthur, 2011). The arguments presented here over-
simplified the core problem, and shut down broader discussion about alternative 
policy solutions while ignoring research and evidence. Rather than drawing 
effectively on evidence to discern the cause of the problems, and the efficacy of 
possible solutions, the arguments illustrate the power of the use of rhetorical 
flourishes and metaphor to define issues and legitimize policy options. 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
It seems that financial literacy education is inevitable, particularly in light of its 
inclusion in PISA, and it will be shaped not by evidence, but rather by the values, 
self-interest, mobilization efforts, and lobbying power of participants in the political 
arena as evidenced in the narratives presented. Given the immense political 
pressure to address economic issues through public policy, a move to link individual 
financial action with national prosperity provides a political rationale to shape (and 
possibly deflect) policy problems to individuals. By focusing on the crusade, 
governments are perceived to be addressing problems of economic instability, 
without having to resort to economic policy shifts.  
 By calling attention to the increased political emphasis on financial literacy in 
K-12 education, international testing and (as is the case in Ontario) policy mandates, 
this paper raises issues that are of importance to those implementing existing 
policy. Only through awareness of the nuances of competing financial literacy 
narratives can front-line educators offer a more balanced approach to instruction. 
As Arthur (2011, p. 214) argues, financial literacy education ought to “dispel the 
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illusions that [perpetuates] the masking of political policies as ‘neutral’ economic 
measures through consumerist language.” The creation and  distribution of financial 
literacy education curricula that counter the political myths described here (for 
example, Pinto & Coulson, 2012) are a possible way for teachers to address these 
issues in classrooms.  
 Finally, this paper points to several areas for future research. Research on 
the political rhetoric and dynamics of financial literacy education in other 
jurisdictions would contribute to a better understanding of international politics. As 
well, further cross-jurisdictional research on how financial literacy education policy 
affect individual and collective perceptions would shed light on the power of the 
political rhetoric. Finally, as Kvernbekk (2011) suggests is the case among 
practitioners, further study and clarification of the concept of evidence in education 
policy should be conducted. While Kvernbekk’s (2011) focus is on practitioner use 
of evidence, similar problems (beyond the scope of this paper) exist in the 
application of evidence to policy production and these warrant clarification and 
study. 
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